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We investigate the choice of regime amongst hard pegs, soft pegs,
managed ﬂoats and independent ﬂoats for a panel of developing
countries. There is evidence of a matched ordering of regimes and
country characteristics. We ﬁnd some evidence for the ‘balance sheet’
hypothesis that foreign liabilities in the banking system and foreign debt
are associated with less exchange rate ﬂexibility, particularly when a ‘de
facto’ regime classiﬁcation is used. Easily the best predictor of a
country’s current regime is its regime in the previous year.
Keywords: exchange rate regimes; developing countries
Introduction
The match between theory and empirics in the choice of exchange rate
regime is historically weak, in the sense that empirical research on the choice
of exchange rate regime has tended to ﬁnd only limited support for
theoretical models (e.g. Collins 1996; Edwards 1996; Poirson 2001; Rizzo
1998), although Levy-Yeyati et al. (2006) claim otherwise for a simple binary
model of pegs versus ﬂoats. The issue is, however, worth re-examining in
view of recent theoretical developments. Frankel (2005) argues that
devaluations are contractionary in emerging markets mainly because of
the eﬀects of exchange rate movements on the balance sheets of both the
private and the public sectors in countries that borrow in foreign currency.
This may be an important motivation for restricting exchange-rate ﬂexibility
in emerging markets (Calvo and Reinhart 2002; Hausmann et al. 2001).
Honig (2005) presents empirical evidence that liability dollarisation is
associated with less exchange rate ﬂexibility.
A second issue is the speciﬁcation of the dependent variable. In the
1990s, the traditional binary split (ﬁxed versus ﬂexible) came under
challenge from the thesis that there is a critical diﬀerence between the
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‘poles’ (independent ﬂoats and ‘hard’ pegs) and ‘intermediate’ exchange rate
regimes (managed ﬂoats and ‘soft’ or adjustable pegs), because the latter
oﬀer too much of a one-way bet to speculators in a world of greatly
increased capital mobility (Fischer 2001; Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ 1995). The
Washington consensus of the 1990s seemed to advocate a ﬂight to the
extremes, at least for emerging markets and more developed economies
(Williamson 2000), although it is not clear that intermediate regimes have
been abandoned to any signiﬁcant extent in practice (Masson 2001).
Nevertheless, this raises the issue of whether intermediate regimes occur in
countries with truly intermediate characteristics, or rather in countries that
are polar in some respects (e.g. in being particularly vulnerable to currency
crises). We address this issue explicitly.
Third, the actual behaviour of exchange rates is occasionally markedly
diﬀerent from the oﬃcial classiﬁcation of an exchange rate regime, particularly
in the case of developing countries (Bubula and O¨tker-Robe 2002; Levy-
Yeyati and Sturzenegger 2005; Reinhart and Rogoﬀ 2004; Shambaugh 2004).
Alternative de facto classiﬁcations have limitations of their own, and
sometimes show disturbingly little correlation with the oﬃcial classiﬁcation
(and with each other) outside the obvious cases. The use of purely statistical
methods that entirely ignore oﬃcial claims about the regime in force is
questionable (Genberg and Swoboda 2005). We check our results for the
oﬃcial classiﬁcation with that of Bubula and O¨tker-Robe (2002), which
backdates the IMF’s post-1999 practice of checking the oﬃcial claims about
the exchange rate regime against other documentary and statistical evidence.
We estimate a model of regime choice that allows for four categories of
regime, and we test whether our results are sensitive to diﬀerent
classiﬁcation methods. The model speciﬁcation emphasises measures of
potential balance sheet eﬀects (foreign debt, foreign-currency liabilities in
the banking system), but also a variety of controls (country size, openness
and inﬂation, ﬁnancial development, per capita GDP, regional dummies).2
We use a sample of developing countries (excluding transition economies)
over the period 1990 to 2000. We exclude advanced countries because of the
likelihood of introducing structural instability (for example, export price
volatility and balance sheet eﬀects are much less likely to be of signiﬁcance
in advanced countries), and also because the correct classiﬁcation of the
European Monetary System is open to doubt. We also exclude transition
economies precisely because they were in transition at this time.
Data and methodology
We gathered information on the exchange rate regime for 81 developing
countries (listed in the Appendix) for the years 1990–2000. We constructed a
data set based on IMF classiﬁcations reported in the Annual Report of
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. The IMF classiﬁcation































is based on the oﬃcial description provided by its members to the IMF. In
order to minimise possible endogeneity problems, exchange rate regimes are
observed on 31 December, whereas the explanatory variables are averages
over the calendar year up to that date.3
Each of these classiﬁcations contains more than four categories. No
aggregation of ﬂoats was required, since they were already divided into only
two categories (independent ﬂoats and managed ﬂoats). Pegs were
aggregated as follows:
(i) Hard Peg regimes: Currency Boards and No Separate Legal Tender;
(ii) Soft Peg regimes: Pegs to a Single Currency, Peg to a Basket of
Currencies and Crawling Pegs and Bands.
To test the robustness of the results, we also use a de facto classiﬁcation that
adjusts for cases where the actual behaviour of the exchange rate is
inconsistent with the declared regime – that of Bubula and O¨tker-Robe
(2002), henceforth called the BR classiﬁcation. This classiﬁcation takes
account of documentary evidence, where this indicates that the regime is
diﬀerent from that oﬃcially declared, and of the statistical behaviour of the
nominal exchange rate (for example, if it remains within a narrow range
against some currency, the episode is classiﬁed as a peg). The main eﬀect of
the adjustment, as Table 1 shows, is that there are many fewer independent
ﬂoats and many more soft pegs, which is consistent with the idea that
developing countries are fearful of ﬂoating (Calvo and Reinhart 2002). Note
that, in the de facto classiﬁcation, intermediate regimes are signiﬁcantly
more frequent, and polar regimes signiﬁcantly less frequent, than in the
declared classiﬁcation.
There are alternative de facto classiﬁcations that use somewhat diﬀerent
methodologies. That of Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) is arguably
over-mechanical (for example, classifying large devaluations as ﬂoats) and
generates an unrealistically large number of regime switches. Reinhart and
Rogoﬀ (2004) focus on parallel-market exchange rates, which reﬂect both
the oﬃcial rate and a variety of exogenous factors. This renders the
economic meaning of any estimated regime choice model based on their data
somewhat unclear, because it is diﬃcult to deﬁne in exactly what sense a
Table 1. Distribution of regimes (%).
Regime Declared (IMF) Classiﬁcation De facto (BR) Classiﬁcation
Hard peg 20.9 20.7
Soft peg 34.6 47.2
Managed ﬂoat 18.9 20.8
Independent ﬂoat 25.9 11.3































regime identiﬁed from exchange rates in the parallel market may be deemed
to have been chosen by the authorities.
We turn now to the regression speciﬁcation. Recent work has focused
on the balance sheet eﬀects of currency movements in countries where
liabilities are mostly denominated in foreign currency. A sharp devaluation
worsens balance sheets, making debts harder to service and tightening
credit constraints for private and public agents that produce non-tradable
goods (Choi and Cook 2004; Honig 2005; Moro´n and Winkelried 2005).4
To capture balance sheet eﬀects, we use two variables – the ratio of
external debt to GDP, and the ratio of foreign-currency liabilities in the
deposit money banks (International Financial Statistics, line 26c) to GDP.
Larger values of these variables are expected to be associated with a
greater probability of pegging.
Beyond this, we include a variety of controls suggested by Optimum
Currency Area (OCA) theory: size, openness, inﬂation, the degree of
economic development, and the degree of ﬁnancial integration.
Size is often measured by GDP (usually in natural logarithms), but it
seems unduly restrictive to assume that the two components of this
(population and GDP per capita) should have the same coeﬃcient, so we
keep them separate.5
We measure openness by the ratio of imports plus exports to GDP. For
given country size, greater openness means that nominal exchange rate
changes are more likely to be oﬀset by movements in the domestic price
level, but it also implies a greater sensitivity of output to external shocks, so
the expected sign of the eﬀect is uncertain.
We transform the percentage inﬂation rate (p) as [100p/(100 þ p)] to
reduce the eﬀect of high-inﬂation outliers. A higher inﬂation rate (relative to
trading partners) implies a greater frequency of adjustment of a peg, and
therefore, if adjustments are costly, a greater incentive to avoid them by
choosing a ﬂoating regime.
Countries with greater ﬁnancial development are likely to have more
liquid ﬁnancial markets, in the absence of which ﬂexible exchange rates
may be excessively volatile. Consequently, we expect greater ﬁnancial
depth to be associated with a greater probability of ﬂoating. We proxy
ﬁnancial depth by the ratio of quasi-money (IFS, line 35) to money (IFS,
line 34).
Ideally, in order to allow for shifts in average values of variables over
time (including the popularity of ﬂoating), it would be desirable to include
year dummies in the regression. Since the algorithm failed to converge when
year dummies were present, we include a time trend instead. It should be
noted that the coeﬃcient of the time trend cannot be interpreted simply as a
shift in the relative popularity of diﬀerent regimes over time, because it
adjusts to ensure that any time trend in the predicted values matches the
time trend in the dependent variable.































In the case of an ordered probit with four outcomes, the equation that
we estimate is as follows:
PrðERR ¼ 1=xÞ ¼ Fðx0bÞ
PrðERR ¼ 2=xÞ ¼ Fðm1  x0bÞ  Fðx0bÞ
PrðERR ¼ 3=xÞ ¼ Fðm2  x0bÞ  Fðm1  x0bÞ
PrðERR ¼ 4=xÞ ¼ 1 Fðm2  x0bÞ
x ¼ ð1;DEBT;FL;POP;YPC;OPE; INF;QMM;TIMEÞ
ð1Þ
where ERR is an indicator variable for the exchange rate regime, F is the
cumulative normal distribution, DEBT is the ratio of external debt to GDP,
FL is the ratio of foreign liabilities in the banking system to GDP, POP is
the log of population, YPC is the log of per capita GDP, OPE is the ratio of
international trade to GDP, INF is the inﬂation rate (transformed as
described above), QMM is the ratio of quasi-money to money, TIME is a
time trend, and b is a vector of coeﬃcients. We begin by estimating binary
probits, which are a special case of equation (1) with only two outcomes.
Since some of the independent variables are non-stationary, estimated
coeﬃcients may be biased in limited samples, even though they are
consistent. Park and Phillips (2000) show that non-stationarity slows
down the rate of convergence in the estimates of coeﬃcients and marginal
eﬀects, even though Wald tests of restrictions still have asymptotic chi-
squared distributions.
Estimation results
With multiple regime categories, an attractive approach is to order the
regimes from the least ﬂexible to the most ﬂexible, and to estimate an
ordered probit model. Before doing this, however, it is important to check
that intermediate regimes are genuinely intermediate. We address this
problem in the following way. We ﬁrst show that polar regimes are indeed
more diﬀerent from each other than are intermediate regimes. Then we
estimate a multinomial model and investigate whether the pattern of
regression coeﬃcients is consistent with a natural ordering of regimes from
least to most ﬂexible.
We begin by estimating a traditional probit model, dividing the sample
into ﬂoats and pegs. Potentially there are 1122 observations (11 years, 102
countries), but data availability for the independent variables reduces the
usable sample to 835. Table 2 shows the results for both the declared (IMF)
classiﬁcation and the de facto (BR) classiﬁcation. The table suggests that
ﬂoaters have on average a larger population, lower per capita incomes,
higher inﬂation, greater openness, and (somewhat more ambiguously) less
external debt and fewer foreign-currency liabilities in the banking system.































The regional dummies (not shown in the table) indicate that there is a
greater propensity to ﬂoat in the western hemisphere. Although there are
more pegs in the de facto classiﬁcation, the two regressions are remarkably
similar overall.
We next test whether the picture is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent if we split the
sample into polar and intermediate regimes. In Table 3, the ﬁrst column
shows a regression for the probability of ﬂoating, according to the IMF
classiﬁcation, given that a country has a polar regime (independent ﬂoat or
hard peg). The second column shows the same regression, given that the
country has an intermediate regime (managed ﬂoat or soft peg). In the ﬁrst
column all the coeﬃcients are signiﬁcant, 84% of the predictions are correct
and the pseudo-R-squared is 0.47. In the second column, despite the slightly
larger sample, many of the coeﬃcients are insigniﬁcant, only 69% of the
predictions are correct, and the pseudo-R-squared is only 0.11. The third








External debt/GDP 70.044 70.044*
(71.67) (72.25)
Foreign currency liabilities 70.915* 70.515
in banking system/GDP (72.45) (71.16)
Log population 0.135** 0.102**
(7.81) (6.73)
Log per capita GDP 70.0907** 70.0970**
(73.25) (74.05)
Inﬂation (%) 0.0128** 0.0061**
[100p/(100 þ p)] (5.30) (4.16)
Openness 0.348** 0.307**





Sample size 835 835
Pseudo-R-squared 0.197 0.169
% correct predictions 74 72
Wald statistic ðw211Þ 176** 153**
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: Coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects estimated at the mean value of the independent variable.
Figures in parentheses are the associated t-statistics. **signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level; *signiﬁcant
at the 0.05 level. Three area dummies (Asia, Western Hemisphere, and Middle East and Europe)
are also included in the regression. The Wald statistic is the test of the signiﬁcance of the whole
regression.































and fourth columns of Table 3 show the equivalent regressions for the
de facto classiﬁcation. Compared with the IMF classiﬁcation, in the BR
classiﬁcation another 133 observations (15.9% of the sample) are classiﬁed
as intermediate, which makes intermediate regime observations nearly twice
as frequent as polar regime observations, and rather more coeﬃcients are
signiﬁcant in the intermediate sample than is the case with the IMF















Constant 710.2** 75.30** 78.78** 74.60**
(76.50) (74.46) (74.41) (74.24)
External debt/GDP 70.087 70.001 70.195** 70.029
(70.99) (70.02) (73.01) (71.32)
Foreign currency 71.96** 70.505 73.01** 0.490
liabilities in banking
system/GDP
(72.73) (71.28) (73.27) (1.28)
Log population 0.247** 0.102** 0.192** 0.104**
(7.30) (4.86) (5.27) (5.84)
Log per capita GDP 70.175** 70.002 70.197** 70.080
(73.67) (70.05) (73.70) (72.78)
Inﬂation (%) 0.0339** 0.0048 0.0264** 70.0002
[100p/(100 þ p)] (8.21) (1.70) (5.80) (70.10)
Openness 0.766** 0.146 0.720** 0.268**
[(Exports þ Imports)/
GDP]
(4.54) (1.65) (3.97) (3.82)
Quasi-money/money 0.0933** 70.0289 0.0966** 70.0220
(2.98) (71.45) (2.92) (71.23)
Time 0.030** 0.020** 0.036** 0.023**
(3.15) (2.42) (3.59) (3.42)
Sample size 422 411 291 544
Pseudo-R-squared 0.468 0.108 0.433 0.150
% correct predictions 84 69 83 73
Wald statistic ðw211Þ 190** 58.6** 96.3** 83.9**
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Chow statistic w2(9) ¼ 130.1** w þ 2(9) ¼ 141.5**
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: Coeﬃcients are marginal eﬀects estimated at the mean value of the independent variable.
**signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level; *signiﬁcant at the 0.05 level. Figures in parentheses are t-statistics.
Three area dummies (Asia, Western Hemisphere, and Middle East and Europe) are also
included in the regression. Polar regimes are independent ﬂoats and hard pegs; intermediate
regimes are managed ﬂoats and soft pegs. The Wald statistic is the test of the signiﬁcance of the
whole regression. The Chow test was based on regressions omitting the area dummies.































classiﬁcation. The diﬀerence between the pseudo-R-squareds is nevertheless
still large (0.43 and 0.15 respectively), and the proportion of correct
predictions again favours the polar sample (83% compared with 73%). A
Chow test reveals that the null hypothesis of equality of coeﬃcients between
the two sub-samples is decisively rejected in each case.
The results in Table 3 show that there is clearly some concordance
between the regression for polar regimes and that for intermediate regimes.
In the case of the majority of coeﬃcients that matter (eight out of eight for
the IMF classiﬁcation, and ﬁve out of eight for the BR classiﬁcation,
ignoring the constant), there is agreement of the signs of the coeﬃcients
between the polar and intermediate sub-samples. Moreover, in every single
case, the coeﬃcient in the polar sub-sample is larger in absolute value. This
suggests a similarity in the factors that determine the choice between a ﬂoat
and a peg, and also that polar regimes have more extreme characteristics.
Table 3 also shows that countries on managed ﬂoats are clearly
empirically distinguishable from those on soft pegs (the Wald statistic is
smaller in the intermediate regime regression than in the polar regime
regression, but still highly signiﬁcant). Managed ﬂoaters tend to be more
populous than soft peggers – this coeﬃcient is signiﬁcant in both the IMF
and BR classiﬁcations. According to the de facto classiﬁcation only,
countries on managed ﬂoats also tend to be poorer and more open to
international trade. The results in Table 3 are approximately what one
would expect if there is an ordering of regimes from independent ﬂoats at
one end of the spectrum to hard pegs at the other. Countries on polar
regimes have more extreme characteristics than countries on intermediate
regimes, and are more diﬀerent from countries at the opposite pole than
from intermediate regimes, but diﬀerent types of intermediate regime also
have diﬀerent characteristics. The much better ﬁt to the data in the case of
the sample of polar regimes is consistent with this hypothesis. For the sake
of completeness, a multinomial model of the choice between all four regimes
is shown in Appendix Table A1.
A signiﬁcant consideration is that treating the data as a panel tends to
exaggerate the statistical signiﬁcance of explanatory variables because
exchange rate regimes are themselves highly persistent. If a country is
observed to be in one regime in year t, it is very likely to be in it in year t þ 1
as well. If explanatory variables are themselves persistent (as they are in most
cases), there will be a signiﬁcant element of pseudo-replication in a panel –
there are fewer truly independent observations than are claimed. One way to
deal with this is to give up trying to explain regimes and just to investigate
regime switches, as in Masson and Ruge-Murcia (2005). Alternatively one
could treat the 11 years as 11 cross-sections, estimate the model for each year
separately and average the resulting t-statistics (since to choose any one year
would be arbitrary). This would be going to the other extreme, because it
throws away the whole time series dimension. An appealing compromise is to































add the lagged exchange rate regime to the regression, since this controls for
regime persistence while retaining the richness of the panel data. Since there
is evidence of an ordering of regimes, it seems most parsimonious to do this
within the framework of an ordered probit model (hard peg ¼ 1, soft
peg ¼ 2, managed ﬂoat ¼ 3, independent ﬂoat ¼ 4).6
Table 4 reports the results of this exercise. Although the dependent
variable is ordered, we include three separate dummies for the lagged regime






External debt/GDP 70.045 70.090*
(70.75) (72.32)
Foreign currency liabilities 70.602 72.09*
in banking system/GDP (70.79) (72.19)
Log population 0.0694* 0.0752*
(2.06) (2.24)
Log per capita GDP 70.110 70.183**
(71.50) (72.78)
Inﬂation (%) 0.0083 0.0077
[100p/(100 þ p)] (1.24) (1.65)
Openness 0.229 0.375**





Lagged hard peg dummy 710.99** 711.97**
(742.2) (736.8)
Lagged managed ﬂoat dummy 1.42** 1.16**
(9.37) (9.97)
Lagged independent ﬂoat dummy 3.38** 2.23**
(13.7) (9.95)
Ancillary parameter: cut 1 71.78 72.03
[s.e. ¼ 0.856] [s.e. ¼ 0.823]
Ancillary parameter: cut 2 1.36 1.22
[s.e. ¼ 0.865] [s.e. ¼ 0.859]
Ancillary parameter: cut 3 2.72 2.51
[s.e. ¼ 0.893] [s.e. ¼ 0.883]
Sample size 835 834
Pseudo-R-squared 0.654 0.561
Wald statistic ðw211Þ 2568** 2162**
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000]
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. **signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level; *signiﬁcant at the
0.05 level. Dependent variable: hard peg ¼ 1, soft peg ¼ 2, managed ﬂoat ¼ 3, independent
ﬂoat ¼ 4. ‘Cut 1’, ‘Cut 2’ and ‘Cut 3’ are the estimated boundaries between regimes for the
ﬁtted values of the regression. The Wald statistic is the test of the signiﬁcance of the whole
regression.































(the omitted category is a soft peg). These are all highly signiﬁcant, which
conﬁrms how persistent exchange rate regimes tend to be. Otherwise, results
are somewhat diﬀerent for the oﬃcial (IMF) and de facto (BR)
classiﬁcations. In the IMF classiﬁcation, the only other signiﬁcant variable
is population, and its coeﬃcient is positive, implying that larger countries
are more likely to have ﬂexible regimes. In the BR classiﬁcation, two
variables have a signiﬁcant positive association with regime ﬂexibility
(population and openness) and three have a signiﬁcant negative association
(per capita GDP, external debt and foreign liabilities in the banking system).
These results imply support for the idea that fear of the impact of exchange
rate movements on agents’ balance sheets induces countries to (attempt to)
limit exchange rate ﬂexibility. Both higher external debt and more foreign-
currency liabilities in the banking system are associated with less ﬂexibility.
Table 4 conﬁrms that countries on hard pegs have particularly well deﬁned
characteristics. The estimated boundary between hard pegs and soft pegs











Ordered probit value 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
Fitted probability 0.405 0.593 0.001 0.000
External debt/GDP 0.035* 70.035* 70.000 70.000
(2.26) (72.26) (71.83) (71.23)
Foreign currency 0.811* 70.803* 70.009* 70.000
liabilities/GDP (2.23) (72.23) (72.03) (71.34)
Log population 70.0292* 0.0288* 0.0003* 0.000
(72.27) (2.27) (1.97) (1.37)
Log per capita GDP 0.0709* 70.0701* 70.0008* 70.000
(2.64) (72.65) (72.10) (71.29)
Inﬂation (%) 70.0030 0.0030 0.0000 0.0000
[100p/(100 þ p)] (71.66) (1.66) (1.53) (1.14)
Openness 70.145* 0.144* 0.002* 0.000
(72.53) (2.53) (2.07) (1.34)
Quasi-money/money 0.0179 70.0177 70.0002 70.0000
(1.22) (71.22) (71.21) (71.05)
Time 70.0279** 0.0276** 0.0003** 0.0000
(74.29) (4.28) (3.19) (1.57)
Lagged hard peg 0.998** 70.625** 70.321** 70.053**
dummy (683.0) (728.8) (716.1) (74.51)
Lagged managed 70.375** 0.357** 0.018** 0.000*
ﬂoat dummy (78.73) (8.83) (4.53) (2.44)
Lagged independent 70.493** 0.344** 0.140** 0.010*
ﬂoat dummy (77.62) (4.17) (3.72) (2.55)
Notes: Figures in parentheses are t-statistics. **signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level; *signiﬁcant at the
0.05 level. Dependent variable: hard peg ¼ 1, soft peg ¼ 2, managed ﬂoat ¼ 3, independent
ﬂoat ¼ 4.































(cut 1) is further from the estimated boundary between managed ﬂoats and
soft pegs (cut 2) than is the estimated boundary between independent ﬂoats
and managed ﬂoats (cut 3). The distances are more than two and about 1.5
standard errors respectively. The numbers in Table 4 are coeﬃcients rather
than marginal eﬀects. For the BR classiﬁcation only, estimated marginal
eﬀects for each regime, together with the appropriate t-ratios, are shown in
Table 5. The estimated probability of any type of ﬂoat is very small (0.1%).
Conclusions
We have tested for balance sheet eﬀects in the choice of exchange rate regime
in developing countries. Countries on polar exchange rate regimes tend to
have more extreme characteristics than those on intermediate regimes. Much
the best predictor of an exchange rate regime is that in force in the previous
year, and, once this is allowed for, our model has virtually no explanatory
power according to the oﬃcial classiﬁcation. Using the de facto classiﬁcation,
however, results are somewhat diﬀerent. In this classiﬁcation, soft pegs are
more numerous and independent ﬂoats less numerous than in the oﬃcial
classiﬁcation. Both external debt and foreign liabilities in the banking system
are associated with less exchange rate ﬂexibility, which is consistent with the
balance sheet hypothesis. A larger population, a lower per capita GDP and
greater openness to international trade are associated with greater ﬂexibility.
Notes
1. The views expressed here are those of the authors and do not represent the
opinions of the World Bank or of its Executive Directors or of the countries that
they represent.
2. Wickham (1985) surveys the earlier literature on the choice of exchange rate regime.
3. This does not entirely remove endogeneity concerns for variables that are
themselves persistent, such as the inﬂation rate.
4. Panama has signiﬁcantly larger values of the ratio of foreign-currency liabilities
in deposit money banks to GDP than other countries. Since Panama is a hard-
peg country that has used the US dollar for a long time, we adjusted this ratio to
zero for Panama, to avoid biasing the results in the direction which we expect –
that exposure of banks’ balance sheets to currency movements causes countries
to prefer less exchange rate ﬂexibility.
5. Where not stated, the source of the data is World Development Indicators.
6. An alternative is to estimate a multinomial probit model, but the algorithm
failed to converge.
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The following countries are included in the sample:
Algeria Argentina Bangladesh Belize
Benin Botswana Brazil Burkina Faso
Cameroon Cape Verde Central Afr. Rep. Chad
Chile Colombia Congo, Dem. Rep. Congo, Rep.
Costa Rica Coˆte d’Ivoire Dominica Dominican Rep.
Ecuador Egypt El Salvador Ethiopia
Fiji Gabon Gambia Ghana
Grenada Guatemala Guinea-Bissau Guyana
Haiti Honduras India Indonesia
Iran Jamaica Jordan Kenya
Libya Madagascar Malawi Malaysia
Maldives Mali Mauritania Mauritius
Mexico Morocco Nepal Nicaragua
Niger Nigeria Pakistan Panama
Papua N.G. Paraguay Peru Philippines
Rwanda Senegal Seychelles Sierra Leone
South Africa Sri Lanka St. Lucia St. Vincent & Grenadines
Swaziland Syria Tanzania Thailand
Togo Trin. & Tobago Tunisia Turkey
Uganda Uruguay Venezuela Zambia
Zimbabwe







































Constant 10.96** (5.94) 11.91** (6.72)
External debt/GDP 0.138 (1.01) 0.128 (1.04)
F.c. liabilities/GDP 1.08 (0.70) 1.45 (0.95)
Log population 70.487** (76.20) 70.553** (77.24)
Log per capita GDP 70.179 (71.16) 70.209 (71.42)
Inﬂation 70.140** (75.37) 70.135** (75.15)
Openness 71.84** (74.00) 71.84** (73.95)
Quasi-money/money 70.309* (72.40) 70.356** (72.79)
Time 0.016 (0.47) 0.036 (1.07)
Managed Float
Constant 79.53** (75.23) 76.07** (74.07)
External debt/GDP 0.002 (0.02) 70.175 (71.36)
F.c. liabilities/GDP 73.56 (71.76) 73.44 (71.73)
Log population 0.477** (5.59) 0.383** (5.25)
Log per capita GDP 0.039 (0.33) 70.331** (72.96)
Inﬂation 0.025* (2.34) 0.015 (1.94)
Openness 0.738* (2.06) 1.41** (4.09)
Quasi-money/money 70.074 (70.88) 71.06 (71.37)
Time 0.098 (2.54) 0.133** (3.97)
Independent Float
Constant 72.51 (71.57) 1.15 (0.50)
External debt/GDP 70.190 (71.54) 70.154 (71.52)
F.c. liabilities/GDP 75.69** (72.97) 712.09* (72.24)
Log population 0.221** (3.18) 70.031 (70.32)
Log per capita GDP 70.331** (72.62) 70.440** (72.81)
Inﬂation 0.043** (4.22) 0.030** (3.14)
Openness 0.355 (1.06) 70.353 (70.76)
Quasi-money/money 0.074 (0.96) 70.028 (70.29)
Time 0.119** (3.58) 0.275** (6.56)
Sample size 835.0 834.0
Pseudo R-squared 0.163 0.181
Note: Omitted category is soft peg. Figures in brackets are z-statistics.
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